German to English translation results for 'schlief ein' designed for tablets and mobile devices. Possible languages include English, Dutch, German, French. Many translated example sentences containing "in schlief" – English-German dictionary and search engine for English translations. Przykłady użycia - "Schlief" po polsku. Poniższe tłumaczenia pochodzą z zewnętrznych źródeł i mogą być niedokładne. philobiblon.eu nie jest odpowiedzialne za ich.
schli̱e̱f [ʃliːf] VERB intr. schlief Imperf von schlafen. Siehe auch: schlafen. schla̱fen [ˈʃlaːfən] VERB intr. Verbtabelle. Schlief. Substantiv, maskulin – unausgebackener Teig; schliefige Stelle in schliefen. starkes Verb – 1. schlüpfen; 2. (von Erdhunden, Frettchen) in einen . Bedeutungen:  landschaftlich; bei Brot, Kartoffeln und dergleichen: unausgebackene Masse, noch rohe Stelle. Herkunft: zu schliefen. Przykłady użycia - "Schlief" po polsku. Poniższe tłumaczenia pochodzą z zewnętrznych źródeł i mogą być niedokładne. philobiblon.eu nie jest odpowiedzialne za ich. Verwendungsbeispiele für ›Schlief‹. maschinell ausgesucht aus den DWDS-Korpora. Niemals wieder will ich wehrlos schlafend ein leichtes Opfer werden. Dativ: Einzahl dem Schlief; Mehrzahl den Schliefen: Akkusativ: Einzahl den Schlief; Mehrzahl die Schliefe. Praktische Beispielsätze. Automatisch erzeugte. Many translated example sentences containing "ich schlief" – English-German dictionary and search engine for English translations.
Verwendungsbeispiele für ›Schlief‹. maschinell ausgesucht aus den DWDS-Korpora. Niemals wieder will ich wehrlos schlafend ein leichtes Opfer werden. schli̱e̱f [ʃliːf] VERB intr. schlief Imperf von schlafen. Siehe auch: schlafen. schla̱fen [ˈʃlaːfən] VERB intr. Verbtabelle. Dativ: Einzahl dem Schlief; Mehrzahl den Schliefen: Akkusativ: Einzahl den Schlief; Mehrzahl die Schliefe. Praktische Beispielsätze. Automatisch erzeugte. Wort und Unwort des Jahres in der Schweiz. German Ich schlief jede Nacht Die Anstalt März 2019 einem hypoxischen Zelt, welches eine Höhenlage von m simuliert. Spanisch Wörterbücher. Gastronomia, dialekt. Wollen Sie einen Satz übersetzen?
The most difficult problem, was to advance railheads quickly enough to stay close enough to the armies, by the time of the Battle of the Marne, all but one German army had advanced too far from its railheads.
Had the battle been won, only in the 1st Army area could the railways have been swiftly repaired, the armies further east could not have been supplied.
German army transport was reorganised in but in , the transport units operating in the areas behind the front line supply columns failed, having been disorganised from the start by Moltke crowding more than one corps per road, a problem that was never remedied but Creveld wrote that even so, the speed of the marching infantry would still have outstripped horse-drawn supply vehicles, if there had been more road-space; only motor transport units kept the advance going.
Creveld concluded that despite shortages and "hungry days", the supply failures did not cause the German defeat on the Marne, Food was requisitioned, horses worked to death and sufficient ammunition was brought forward in sufficient quantities so that no unit lost an engagement through lack of supplies.
Creveld also wrote that had the French been defeated on the Marne, the lagging behind of railheads, lack of fodder and sheer exhaustion, would have prevented much of a pursuit.
Schlieffen had behaved "like an ostrich" on supply matters which were obvious problems and although Moltke remedied many deficiencies of the Etappendienst the German army supply system , only improvisation got the Germans as far as the Marne; Creveld wrote that it was a considerable achievement in itself.
In , John Keegan wrote that Schlieffen had desired to repeat the frontier victories of the Franco-Prussian War in the interior of France but that fortress-building since that war had made France harder to attack; a diversion through Belgium remained feasible but this "lengthened and narrowed the front of advance".
This number of roads was not enough for the ends of marching columns to reach the heads by the end of the day; this physical limit meant that it would be pointless to add troops to the right wing.
Schlieffen was realistic and the plan reflected mathematical and geographical reality; expecting the French to refrain from advancing from the frontier and the German armies to fight great battles in the hinterland was found to be wishful thinking.
Schlieffen pored over maps of Flanders and northern France, to find a route by which the right wing of the German armies could move swiftly enough to arrive within six weeks, after which the Russians would have overrun the small force guarding the eastern approaches of Berlin.
If the French retreated into the "great fortress" into which France had been made, back to the Oise, Aisne, Marne or Seine, the war could be endless.
Schlieffen also advocated an army to advance with or behind the right wing , bigger by 25 percent, using untrained and over-age reservists.
The extra corps would move by rail to the right wing but this was limited by railway capacity and rail transport would only go as far the German frontiers with France and Belgium, after which the troops would have to advance on foot.
The extra corps appeared at Paris, having moved further and faster than the existing corps, along roads already full of troops.
Keegan wrote that this resembled a plan falling apart, having run into a logical dead end. Railways would bring the armies to the right flank, the Franco-Belgian road network would be sufficient for them to reach Paris in the sixth week but in too few numbers to defeat decisively the French.
Another , men would be necessary for which there was no room; Schlieffen's plan for a quick victory was fundamentally flawed. In the s, after the dissolution of the German Democratic Republic , it was discovered that some Great General Staff records had survived the Potsdam bombing in and been confiscated by the Soviet authorities.
About 3, files and 50 boxes of documents were handed over to the Bundesarchiv German Federal Archives containing the working notes of Reichsarchiv historians, business documents, research notes, studies, field reports, draft manuscripts, galley proofs, copies of documents, newspaper clippings and other papers.
The trove shows that Der Weltkrieg is a "generally accurate, academically rigorous and straightforward account of military operations", when compared to other contemporary official accounts.
The first volumes attempted to explain why the German war plans failed and who was to blame. The summary was for a revised edition of the volumes of Der Weltkrieg on the Marne campaign and was made available to the public.
There is no evidence here [in Schlieffen's thoughts on the Generalstabsreise Ost eastern war game ]—or anywhere else, come to that—of a Schlieffen credo dictating a strategic attack through Belgium in the case of a two-front war.
That may seem a rather bold statement, as Schlieffen is positively renowned for his will to take the offensive.
But we should be aware that he very often speaks of an attack when he means counter-attack. Whenever we come across that formula we have to take note of the context, which frequently reveals that Schlieffen is talking about a counter-attack in the framework of a defensive strategy.
The thought-experiment and the later deployment plan modelled an isolated Franco-German war albeit with aid from German allies , the plan was one of three and then four plans available to the Great General Staff.
A lesser error was that the plan modelled the decisive defeat of France in one campaign of fewer than forty days and that Moltke the Younger foolishly weakened the attack, by being over-cautious and strengthening the defensive forces in Alsace-Lorraine.
Aufmarsch I West had the more modest aim of forcing the French to choose between losing territory or committing the French army to a decisive battle , in which it could be terminally weakened and then finished off later.
The plan was predicated on a situation when there would be no enemy in the east [ In , Robert Foley wrote that Schlieffen and Moltke the Younger had recently been severely criticised by Martin Kitchen , who had written that Schlieffen was a narrow-minded technocrat , obsessed with minutiae.
Arden Bucholz had called Moltke too untrained and inexperienced to understand war planning, which prevented him from having a defence policy from to ; it was the failings of both men that caused them to keep a strategy that was doomed to fail.
Foley wrote that Schlieffen and Moltke the Younger had good reason to retain Vernichtungsstrategie as the foundation of their planning, despite their doubts as to its validity.
Schlieffen had been convinced that only in a short war was there the possibility of victory and that by making the army operationally superior to its potential enemies, Vernichtungsstrategie could be made to work.
The unexpected weakening of the Russian army in — and the exposure of its incapacity to conduct a modern war was expected to continue for a long time and this made a short war possible again.
Since the French had a defensive strategy, the Germans would have to take the initiative and invade France, which was shown to be feasible by war games in which French border fortifications were outflanked.
Moltke continued with the offensive plan, after it was seen that the enfeeblement of Russian military power had been for a much shorter period than Schlieffen had expected.
The substantial revival in Russian military power that began in would certainly have matured by , making the Tsarist army unbeatable.
The end of the possibility of a short eastern war and the certainty of increasing Russian military power meant that Moltke had to look to the west for a quick victory before Russian mobilisation was complete.
Speed meant an offensive strategy and made doubts about the possibility of forcing defeat on the French army irrelevant. The only way to avoid becoming bogged down in the French fortress zones was by a flanking move into terrain where open warfare was possible, where the German army could continue to practice Bewegungskrieg a war of manoeuvre.
Moltke the Younger used the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June , as an excuse to attempt Vernichtungsstrategie against France, before Russian rearmament deprived Germany of any hope of victory.
In , Holmes published a summary of his thinking about the Schlieffen Plan and the debates about it in Not the Schlieffen Plan. He wrote that people believed that the Schlieffen Plan was for a grand offensive against France to gain a decisive victory in six weeks.
The Russians would be held back and then defeated with reinforcements rushed by rail from the west. Holmes wrote that no-one had produced a source showing that Schlieffen intended a huge right-wing flanking move into France, in a two-front war.
The Memorandum was for War against France , in which Russia would be unable to participate. Schlieffen had thought about such an attack on two general staff rides Generalstabsreisen in , on the staff ride of and in the deployment plan Aufmarsch West I, for —06 and —07, in which all of the German army fought the French.
In none of these plans was a two-front war contemplated; the common view that Schlieffen thought that such an offensive would guarantee victory in a two-front war was wrong.
In his last exercise critique in December , Schlieffen wrote that the Germans would be so outnumbered against France and Russia, that the Germans must rely on a counter-offensive strategy against both enemies, to eliminate one as quickly as possible.
The post-war idea of a six-week timetable, derived from discussions in May , when Moltke had said that he wanted to defeat the French "in six weeks from the start of operations".
The deadline did not appear in the Schlieffen Memorandum and Holmes wrote that Schlieffen would have considered six weeks to be far too long to wait in a war against France and Russia.
Schlieffen wrote that the Germans must "wait for the enemy to emerge from behind his defensive ramparts" and intended to defeat the French army by a counter-offensive, tested in the general staff ride west of The Germans concentrated in the west and the main body of the French advanced through Belgium into Germany.
The Germans then made a devastating counter-attack on the left bank of the Rhine near the Belgian border. The hypothetical victory was achieved by the 23rd day of mobilisation; nine active corps had been rushed to the eastern front by the 33rd day for a counter-attack against the Russian armies.
Even in , Schlieffen thought the Russians capable of mobilising in 28 days and that the Germans had only three weeks to defeat the French, which could not be achieved by a promenade through France.
The French were required by the treaty with Russia, to attack Germany as swiftly as possible but could advance into Belgium only after German troops had infringed Belgian sovereignty.
Joffre had to devise a plan for an offensive that avoided Belgian territory, which would have been followed in , had the Germans not invaded Belgium first.
For this contingency, Joffre planned for three of the five French armies about 60 percent of the French first-line troops to invade Lorraine on 14 August, to reach the river Saar from Sarrebourg to Saarbrücken, flanked by the German fortress zones around Metz and Strasbourg.
The Germans would defend against the French, who would be enveloped on three sides then the Germans would attempt an encircling manoeuvre from the fortress zones to annihilate the French force.
Joffre understood the risks but would have had no choice, had the Germans used a defensive strategy. Joffre would have had to run the risk of an encirclement battle against the French First, Second and Fourth armies.
In , Schlieffen had emphasised that the German fortress zones were not havens but jumping-off points for a surprise counter-offensive.
Holmes wrote that Schlieffen never intended to invade France through Belgium, in a war against France and Russia,. If we want to visualize Schlieffen's stated principles for the conduct of a two front war coming to fruition under the circumstances of , what we get in the first place is the image of a gigantic Kesselschlacht to pulverise the French army on German soil, the very antithesis of Moltke's disastrous lunge deep into France.
That radical break with Schlieffen's strategic thinking ruined the chance of an early victory in the west on which the Germans had pinned all their hopes of prevailing in a two-front war.
Zuber wrote that the Schlieffen Memorandum was a "rough draft" of a plan to attack France in a one-front war, which could not be regarded as an operational plan, as the memo was never typed up, was stored with Schlieffen's family and envisioned the use of units not in existence.
The "plan" was not published after the war, when it was being called an infallible recipe for victory, ruined by the failure of Moltke adequately to select and maintain the aim of the offensive.
Zuber wrote that if Germany faced a war with France and Russia, the real Schlieffen Plan was for defensive counter-attacks. Holmes asked why Moltke attempted to achieve either objective with 34 corps , first-line troops only 70 percent of the minimum required.
The Germans would then have to break through the reinforced line in the opening stages of the next campaign, which would be much more costly.
Holmes wrote that. Schlieffen anticipated that the French could block the German advance by forming a continuous front between Paris and Verdun.
His argument in the memorandum was that the Germans could achieve a decisive result only if they were strong enough to outflank that position by marching around the western side of Paris while simultaneously pinning the enemy down all along the front.
Moltke's army along the front from Paris to Verdun, consisted of 22 corps , combat troops , only 15 of which were active formations. Lack of troops made "an empty space where the Schlieffen Plan requires the right wing of the German force to be".
In the final phase of the first campaign, the German right wing was supposed to be "outflanking that position a line west from Verdun, along the Marne to Paris by advancing west of Paris across the lower Seine" but in "Moltke's right wing was operating east of Paris against an enemy position connected to the capital city Breaching a defensive line from Verdun, west along the Marne to Paris, was impossible with the forces available, something Moltke should have known.
Holmes could not adequately explain this deficiency but wrote that Moltke's preference for offensive tactics was well known and thought that unlike Schlieffen, Moltke was an advocate of the strategic offensive,.
Moltke subscribed to a then fashionable belief that the moral advantage of the offensive could make up for a lack of numbers on the grounds that "the stronger form of combat lies in the offensive" because it meant "striving after positive goals".
The German offensive of failed because the French refused to fight a decisive battle and retreated to the "secondary fortified area".
In , Mark Humphries and John Maker published Germany's Western Front , an edited translation of the Der Weltkrieg volumes for , covering German grand strategy in and the military operations on the Western Front to early September.
Humphries and Maker wrote that the interpretation of strategy put forward by Delbrück had implications about war planning and began a public debate, in which the German military establishment defended its commitment to Vernichtunsstrategie.
The editors wrote that German strategic thinking was concerned with creating the conditions for a decisive war determining battle in the west, in which an envelopment of the French army from the north would inflict such a defeat on the French as to end their ability to prosecute the war within forty days.
Humphries and Maker called this a simple device to fight France and Russia simultaneously and to defeat one of them quickly, in accordance with years of German military tradition.
Schlieffen may or may not have written the memorandum as a plan of operations but the thinking in it was the basis for the plan of operations devised by Moltke the Younger in The failure of the campaign was a calamity for the German Empire and the Great General Staff, which was disbanded by the Treaty of Versailles in Some of the writers of Die Grenzschlachten im Westen The Frontier Battles in the West  , the first volume of Der Weltkrieg , had already published memoirs and analyses of the war, in which they tried to explain why the plan failed, in terms that confirmed its validity.
Förster, head of the Reichsarchiv from and reviewers of draft chapters like Groener, had been members of the Great General Staff and were part of a post-war "annihilation school".
It was for the reader to form conclusions and the editors wrote that though the volume might not be entirely objective, the narrative was derived from documents lost in The Schlieffen Memorandum of was presented as an operational idea, which in general was the only one that could solve the German strategic dilemma and provide an argument for an increase in the size of the army.
The adaptations made by Moltke were treated in Die Grenzschlachten im Westen , as necessary and thoughtful sequels of the principle adumbrated by Schlieffen in and that Moltke had tried to implement a plan based on the memorandum in The Reichsarchiv historians's version showed that Moltke had changed the plan and altered its emphasis because it was necessary in the conditions of The failure of the plan was explained in Der Weltkrieg by showing that command in the German armies was often conducted with vague knowledge of the circumstances of the French, the intentions of other commanders and the locations of other German units.
Communication was botched from the start and orders could take hours or days to reach units or never arrive.
Auftragstaktik , the decentralised system of command that allowed local commanders discretion within the commander's intent, operated at the expense of co-ordination.
Aerial reconnaissance had more influence on decisions than was sometimes apparent in writing on the war but it was a new technology, the results of which could contradict reports from ground reconnaissance and be difficult for commanders to resolve.
It always seemed that the German armies were on the brink of victory, yet the French kept retreating too fast for the German advance to surround them or cut their lines of communication.
Decisions to change direction or to try to change a local success into a strategic victory were taken by army commanders ignorant of their part in the OHL plan, which frequently changed.
Der Weltkrieg portrays Moltke the Younger in command of a war machine "on autopilot", with no mechanism of central control.
Optimism is a requirement of command and expressing a belief that wars can be quick and lead to a triumphant victory, can be an essential aspect of a career as a peacetime soldier.
Moltke the Younger was realistic about the nature of a great European war but this conformed to professional wisdom. Moltke the Elder was proved right in his prognostication to the Reichstag , that European alliances made a repeat of the successes of and impossible and anticipated a war of seven or thirty years' duration.
Universal military service enabled a state to exploit its human and productive resources to the full but also limited the causes for which a war could be fought; Social Darwinist rhetoric made the likelihood of surrender remote.
Having mobilised and motivated the nation, states would fight until they had exhausted their means to continue.
There had been a revolution in fire power since , with the introduction of breech-loading weapons , quick-firing artillery and the evasion of the effects of increased fire power, by the use of barbed wire and field fortifications.
The prospect of a swift advance by frontal assault was remote; battles would be indecisive and decisive victory unlikely.
Major-General Ernst Köpke , the Generalquartiermeister of the German army in , wrote that an invasion of France past Nancy would turn into siege warfare and the certainty of no quick and decisive victory.
Emphasis on operational envelopment came from the knowledge of a likely tactical stalemate. The problem for the German army was that a long war implied defeat, because France, Russia and Britain, the probable coalition of enemies, were far more powerful.
The role claimed by the German army as the anti-socialist foundation on which the social order was based, also made the army apprehensive about the internal strains that would be generated by a long war.
Schlieffen was faced by a contradiction between strategy and national policy and advocated a short war based on Vernichtungsstrategie , because of the probability of a long one.
Given the recent experience of military operations in the Russo-Japanese War, Schlieffen resorted to an assumption that international trade and domestic credit could not bear a long war and this tautology justified Vernichtungsstrategie.
Grand strategy , a comprehensive approach to warfare, that took in economics and politics as well as military considerations, was beyond the capacity of the Great General Staff as it was among the general staffs of rival powers.
Moltke the Younger found that he could not dispense with Schlieffen's offensive concept, because of the objective constraints that had led to it.
Moltke was less certain and continued to plan for a short war, while urging the civilian administration to prepare for a long one, which only managed to convince people that he was indecisive.
Auftragstaktik led to the stereotyping of decisions at the expense of flexibility to respond to the unexpected, something increasingly likely after first contact with the opponent.
Moltke doubted that the French would conform to Schlieffen's more optimistic assumptions. In May he said, "I will do what I can. We are not superior to the French.
Stahel wrote that contemporary and subsequent German assessments of Moltke's implementation of Aufmarsch II West in , did not criticise the planning and supply of the campaign, even though these were instrumental to its failure and that this failure of analysis had a disastrous sequel, when the German armies were pushed well beyond their limits in Operation Barbarossa , during No one outside the Great General Staff could point out problems with the deployment plan or make arrangements.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Count Alfred von Schlieffen in Battle of the Frontiers See also: Total war. Map showing areas of France occupied during the Franco-Prussian War.
Main article: Franco-Prussian War. Francs-tireurs in the Vosges during the Franco-Prussian War. Map of French, Belgian and German frontier fortifications, Main article: Battle of the Frontiers.
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London: Hogarth Press. Rothenberg, G. In Paret, P. Innocent rascals apparently, are also the scoundrels who, in Noisy-le-Grand, pulled two women out of their car and dragged them through the streets by the hair.
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